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China's Economic Statecraft Toward 
Southeast Asia: Free Trade Agreement 
and "Peaceful Rise" 
Vincent Wei-cheng Wang* 
ABSTRACT 
This article examines the China-ASEAN free trade agreement 
(ACFTA) in light of regionalism in East Asia and China's new 
diplomacy. Dubbed "peaceful rise," China's new diplomatic strat-
egy seeks to capitalize on globalization to accelerate China's eco-
nomic development and elevate China's power. In Southeast 
Asia, "peaceful rise" is promoted through a FTA agenda reflect-
ing geopolitical and geoeconomic objectives - cultivating good-
will among neighbors, maintaining regional stability, and 
securing key markets and raw materials needed for China's eco-
nomic growth. China sees ACFT A as a tool to respond to chal-
lenges posed by competitive regionalisms in the world economy, 
cement growing economic ties with Southeast Asia, secure raw 
materials, and ensure a peaceful environment to support China's 
growing influence and counterbalances American and Japanese 
power. ASEAN nations are attracted by the opportunites entailed 
in China's expanding trade and economy; they also seek to lever-
age ACFTA to additional FTAs with important trading partners 
within (e.g., Japan) or outside (e.g., the U.S.) the region. Due to 
the disparate levels of development and policy priorities of 
ASEAN members, ACFTA may cause various challenges to indi-
vidual members and ASEAN as a whole. 
Key words: China, ASEAN, Southeast Asia, free trade agreement, 
peaceful rise, peaceful ascendancy, economic state-
craft, strategic trade 
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INTRODUCTION: THE RisE OF CHINA IN AsiA 
Since the end of the Cold War, the political and economic or-
der in the East Asian region 1 has undergone a significant transfor-
mation. One of the most important sources for this change is 
China's growing clout and influence. Several crucial factors con-
tribute to this development: China's rapid and sustained economic 
growth (on average 9% per year over the past two decades), Ja-
pan's relative decline as a result of its decade-long recession, the 
1997-8 Asian Financial Crisis which decimated several high-flying 
Asian economies, and the overextension of the United States' mili-
tary resources and political capital due to the war on terror, the 
daunting task of rebuilding Iraq, and the challenge posed by a nu-
clear North Korea. 
Whereas China's rise in the mid-1990s caused much concern 
among its neighbors and the U.S.,2 China's further ascent in the 
early 2000s has instead generated more equanimity. China's ex-
panding economy is now regarded more as an opportunity than a 
threat, and its more polished foreign policy exudes confidence and 
poise.3 Does this change have more to do with a fundamentally 
changed Chinese foreign policy or with the changing perception of 
other nations on a rising China? 
Nowhere is this shift more evident than in Southeast Asia, espe-
cially the changing attitudes of ASEAN (Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations), which during the Cold War had kept a weary eye 
on China and did not normalize relations with China until the 
1990s. Therefore, the announcement by ASEAN and China in No-
vember 2001 that they intended to create an FTA (Free Trade 
Area) between them within a decade symbolized a profound 
change. On November 4, 2002, at the Eighth ASEAN-China Sum-
mit in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, ASEAN leaders and Chinese Pre-
mier Zhu Rongji signed a Framework Agreement on 
Comprehensive Economic Cooperation, which enunciated the par-
1 For the purpose of this paper, the term "East Asia" encompasses both Northeast 
Asia and Southeast Asia. 
2 For a useful compilation of commentaries on the implications of a rising China, see 
Michael Brown eta!, eds., The Rise of China (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000). The two 
books that helped set the stage for the "great debate" over China were Richard Bernstein 
and Ross H. Munro, The Coming Conflict with China (New York: Knopf, 1997) and Andrew J. 
Nathan and RobertS. Ross, The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress (New York: Norton, 1997). 
3 For an account on China's more confident diplomacy, see EvanS. Medeiros and M. 
Taylor Fravel, "China's New Diplomacy," Foreign Affairs 82(6) (November-December 2003): 
22-35. 
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ties' commitment and laid the groundwork for the eventual estab-
lishment of an ASEAN-China FTA (ACFTA) by 2010 for the 
ASEAN 6 (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, 
and Thailand) and 2015 for the newer members (Cambodia, Laos, 
Myanmar, and Vietnam). The Framework Agreement set 1 July 
2003 as the date when the agreement was to enter into force. 4 To 
pursue the goals set in the Framework Agreement, the ACFTA par-
ties negotiated for three years and concluded an Agreement on 
Trade in Goods for the Framework Agreement on 29 November 
2004 at the summit meeting in Vientiane, Laos. This trade in 
goods agreement formally took effect on 1 July 2005.5 
Comparing today with ASEAN's founding epoch, the contrasts 
cannot be more vivid: In 1967, China was mired in its angry self-
imposed isolation known as the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolu-
tion, whereas ASEAN was established partly to form a collective 
counterweight against the regime that had exported revolutions 
and inspired guerrilla insurgency in several Southeast Asian na-
tions. Nowadays China is deeply engaged with the world and even 
assumes the hitherto unprecedented role as a trade promoter in 
East Asia, considering that its market-oriented economic reform 
started only in 1978 and it did not become a member of the World 
Trade Organization until late 2001. 
What explain these changes? What are the political and eco-
nomic impetuses for the ASEAN-China FTA? What is the relation-
ship between China's current trade offensive and its "new" foreign 
policy thinking? Does it represent a long-term and fundamental 
shift in China's economic statecraft or only a short-term tactical 
expedient aimed at buying the crucial time China needs in becom-
ing the preeminent actor in the region capable of securing its core 
interests and projecting its power? 
4 ASEAN Secretariat, News Release, 4 November 2002, "ASEAN and China Sign Eco-
nomic Pact," <http:/ /www.aseansec.org/l3169.htm>; Framework Agreement on Compre-
hensive Economic Cooperation Between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and 
the People's Republic of China," <http:/ /www.aseansec.org/13197.htm>; and "ABEAN-
China Dialogue," <http:/ /www.aseansec.org/7585.htm>. 
5 ASEAN Secretariat, Agreement on Trade in Goods of the Framework Agreement 
on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Between the Association of Southeast Asian Na-
tions and the People's Republic of China <http:/ /www.aseansec.org/16647.htm>; Kevin G. 
Cai, "The China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement and Taiwan," Journal of Contemporary China 
14( 45) (November 2005): 590; and Alyssa Greenwald, "The ASEAN-China Free Trade Area 
(ACFTA): A Legal Response to China's Economic Rise?" Duke journal of Comparative and 
International Law 16 (2005): 193, <http:/ /www.law.duke.edu/journals/djcil/articles/djcil 
16p193.htm>. 
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This article argues that China's activist trade agenda is moti-
vated primarily by geopolitical considerations and secondarily by 
geoeconomic reasons. By examining the ASEAN-China FTA in 
light of regionalism in East Asia and China's new diplomacy, this 
article argues that China's ITA with the ASEAN is driven by a polit-
ical logic to respond to challenges posed by competitive regional-
isms in the world economy, to cement growing economic ties with 
Southeast Asian nations, to secure raw materials crucial to China's 
economic development, and to ensure a peaceful and stable envi-
ronment close to home so as to buttress China's growing influence 
and counterbalance American and Japanese power. It is thus a 
concrete example of economic statecraft employed to facilitate 
China's "peaceful ascendancy." 
ASEAN nations are attracted by the opportunities brought 
about by China's economic expansion and trade liberalization; 
they also seek to leverage their FTA with China to additional FTAs 
with important trading partners within (e.g., Japan) or outside 
(e.g., the U.S.) the region. However, because of the disparate 
levels of development and policy priorities of its members, 
ASEAN's FTA with China is likely to cause various challenges to 
individual members and the organization as a whole. 
This article believes that among the major paradigms of inter-
national political economy, the realist perspective best informs 
China's approach to trade:6 China uses trade as a foreign policy 
instrument to advance its national interests and power, and its in-
creased power helps acquire more wealth, on which the Commu-
nist leadership's continued rule depends. 
This article is divided into five sections. Section one defines the 
broader context of the issue, by providing some background on 
regional trading arrangements while emphasizing the proliferation 
of such arrangements in the 1990s. Section two examines the 
profiles of China's economic interactions with ASEAN. Section 
three discusses the main political calculus in China's decision to 
6 The realist approach to international political economy is called mercantilism or 
economic nationalism, and has enjoyed a tradition as long as the presently predominant 
liberalism. Alexander Hamilton, Friedrich List, Jacob Viner are among the most impor-
tant writers of this school. See Alexander Hamilton's Report on Manufacturers and Friedrich 
List's Political and Cosmopolitical Economy, collected in George T. Crane and Abla Amawi, 
eds., The Theoretical Evolution of International Political Economy: A Reader, 2nd ed. (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 37-54;Jacob Viner, "Power versus Plenty as Objectives 
of Foreign Policy in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries," World Politics 1 (October 
1948): 1-29. 
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pursue FTA with ASEAN, paying special attention to the larger stra-
tegic factors associated with China's desire to attain "peaceful as-
cendancy." Section four discusses ASEAN nations' motivations and 
assesses the impact of ACFTA on them. Section five speculates on 
the future of China's "peaceful rise" by invoking historical prece-
dents and contemporary constructivist theory of international 
relations. 
RisiNG REGIONALISM IN THE WoRLD EcoNoMY 
Regional economic integration is not a new phenomenon. 
Viewed as the deepening of intra-regional economic interdepen-
dence in a given region, through intra-regional trade, foreign di-
rect investment (FDI) and harmonization of commercial 
regulations, standards, and practices, it probably predated the 
Westphalian international system. Scholars coined the phrase "re-
gionalism" to characterize the political movement towards the crea-
tion or expansion of regional trade organizations or associations.7 
However, the proliferation of regional trading blocs - often 
known as regional integration agreements (RIAs) -and the deep-
ening of relationships among existing members of certain trading 
blocs represent a major development in international relations in 
recent decades. Most industrial and developing countries in the 
world are members of a regional integration agreement, and many 
belong to more than one. In fact, over one-half of world trade 
takes place within such agreements.8 
During the Cold War, divergent diplomatic alignment and eco-
nomic systems hampered the development of regional trade agree-
ments (RTAs). With the end of the Cold War, the past decade has 
witnessed an especially sharp increase in RTAs. According to 
World Trade Organization (WTO) figures, eighty-one percent of 
the 151 notified RTAs in goods since 1958 went into effect after 
1990- 29 in 1990-4, 64 in 1995-9, and 30 in 2000-2.9 As the end of 
2002, a total of 259 RTAs had been notified to the WTO and its 
predecessor, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT); 
among them 176 RTAs are currently in force. An additional 70 
RTAs are believed to be operational but not yet notified, and about 
7 May T. Yeung, Nicholas Perdikis, and William A. Kerr, Regional Trading Blocs in the 
Global Economy (Cheltenham, UK Edward Elgar, 1999), p. 17. 
8 The World Bank, Trading Blocs (New York: Oxford University Press, for the World 
Bank, 2000), p. l. 
9 World Trade Organization, World Trade Report 2003 (Geneva: WTO, 2003), p. 47. 
10 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF CHINESE STUDIES [Vol. 13:5 
70 are under negotiation. Among WTO's 146 members as of 2003, 
only Mongolia is not already in a RTA or engaged in negotiations 
on preferential agreements. 10 
One important reason for the increasing popularity of prefer-
ential trade agreements (PTAs) is the seemingly difficult process 
and bleak prospects for progress on the multilateral agenda - the 
latest example being the collapse of the Doha Round WTO meet-
ing in 2003 in Cancun, Mexico, after which US trade representative 
Robert Zoellick warned that the U.S. might press ahead with bilat-
eral and regional trade deals.U 
Table 1 shows that 43 percent of world merchandise trade now 
occurs under the umbrella of preferential trade agreements. If all 
RTAs currently under negotiation are successfully concluded 
before 2005, then over 50 percent of world merchandise trade will 
occur among countries linked by preferential agreements. 
TABLE 1 
PREFERENTIAL TRADE SHARE OF INTRA-RTAs TRADE IN 
MERCHANDISE IMPORTS OF MAJOR REGIONS, 2000 AND 2005 
Western Europe 
Transitional economies 
North America (incl. Mexico) 
Mrica 
Middle East 
Latin America ( excl. Mexico) 
Asia 
World 
(as of January 2003) 
2000 2005 
64.7 67.0 
61.6 61.6 
41.4 51.6 
37.2 43.6 
19.2 38.1 
18.3 63.6 
5.6 16.2 
43.2 51.2 
Source: World Trade Organization, World Trade Report 2003 (Geneva: 
WTO, 2003), p. 48. 
Table 1 also shows that as of now, Western Europe leads in pref-
erential trade (hence this fact evokes the image of "Fortress Eu-
rope"), whereas Asia is the region where preferential trade 
arrangements are the least developed. Again, the lingering effects 
of Cold War geopolitics in Asia partially explain this. Indeed, the 
10 World Trade Report 2003, p. 46. WTO now has 149 members. 
11 "Road from Cancun Leads to Brussels: The Hypocrisy of Rich Countries Blocks 
Trade Liberalization," The Financial Times (16 September 2003): 22. 
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current proliferation of PTAs in Asia to a considerable extent rep-
resents a "catching up" phenomenon. 
PTAs are the opposite of the principle of nondiscrimination 
trade policies - the cornerstone of the GATT /WTO system. The 
Anglo-American Allies who planned the global economic system 
after World War II- which became known as the Bretton Woods 
system - believed that the discriminatory trade policies in the 1930s 
had contributed to the collapse of world trade and in turn to the 
Great Depression and the ensuing international conflict. To pre-
vent a recurrence, they enshrined the nondiscrimination policy 
into Article I of the GATT, which required (unconditional) most-
favored nation (MFN) for all GATT members. 12 
However, since its outset, the GATT allowed a major deviation 
from the MFN principle. Article XXIV states that a group of coun-
tries may form a free trade area or custom union, dropping barri-
ers among themselves, subject to a few requirementsP While 
RTAs are supposed to be, and they are usually found to be, WTO-
consistent, some analysts attribute this to the fact that "the require-
ments of Article XXIV and the Enabling Clause and GATS [Gen-
eral Agreement on Trade in Services] are very weak and have never 
been enforced."14 This raises the question of whether RTAs are 
"building blocks" or "stumbling blocks" for global multilateral 
trade under the WTO's auspices. 15 
12 Jeffrey A. Frankel, Regional Trading Blocs in the World Economic System (Washington: 
Institute for International Economics, 1997), pp. 2-3; and Jagdish Bhagwati, Pravin 
Krishna, and Arvind Panagariya, eds., Trading Blocs: Alternative Approaches to Analyzing Prefer-
ential Trade Agreements (Cambridge, MA: MIT press, 1999), p. 6 
13 These requirements are: (1) "Substantially all" barriers among the members be 
removed; (2) trade barriers against nonmembers not be made more restrictive than 
before; and (3) subsequent progress toward economic integration is supposed to be expe-
ditious - normally not to exceed ten years. Frankel, Regional Trading Blocs, p. 3. 
14 P. Lloyd, "Implications for the Multilateral Trading System of the New Preferen-
tial Trading Arrangements in the Asia-Pacific Region." PECC Trade Forum paper, Vancou-
ver, 11-12 November 2002. Available at <http:/ /www.pecc.org>. Quoted injiangyu Wang, 
"The Legal and Policy Considerations of China-ASEAN ITA: The Impact on the Multilat-
eral Trading System," in Ho Khai Leong and Samuel C.Y. Ku, eds., China and Southeast Asia: 
Global Changes and Regional Challenges (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 
2005), p. 55. 
15 Maghaisvarei Sellakumaran, "WTO at the Crossroads and the Road Ahead for 
ASEAN," in Economic Outlook 2004-2005 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 
2005), pp. 52-54. 
12 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF CHINESE STUDIES [Vol. 13:5 
It is useful to differentiate the various levels of integration 
under formal regional trading agreements so as to understand the 
ACFTA in a proper comparative and theoretical context. 16 
Levels of Integration 
(1) Preferential trade arrangements: The loosest type of ar-
rangement is the granting of partial preferences to a set of trading 
partners. If the concessions are one-way, this is called a preferential 
trade arrangement- as seen in the unilateral concessions made by an 
industrialized country to less developed countries (LDCs), such as 
the Generalized System of Preferences ( GSP), a practice that the 
GATT always permitted. If the concessions are reciprocal, we may 
call it preferential trade area (PTA) to describe the club of nations 
covered. 
(2) Free Trade Area (FTA): If the members of a PTA eliminate 
all tariffs and quantitative import restrictions among themselves -
i.e., 100 percent preferences - then they form a free trade area 
(FTA). But in fact they typically retain varying levels of tariffs and 
other barriers against the products of nonmembers. 17 
(3) Custom Union (CU): The next level of integration occurs 
when the members of an FTA go beyond removing trade barriers 
among themselves and set a common level of trade barriers vis-a-vis 
outsiders. This at a minimum entails a common external tariff, 
which is no higher than the average of the previously existing tar-
iffs of the member countries. A full CU will set all trade policy for 
its members as a whole. 
(4) Common Market: Whereas PTA, FTA, and CU are different 
models of "shallow integration," common market and economic 
union constitute "deep integration." Beyond the free exchange of 
goods and services among members, a common market entails the 
free movement of factors of production: labor and capital. 
(5) Economic Union: Economic union involves harmonizing 
national economic policies, including typically taxes and a com-
mon currency. 
The European Union (EU) is the best example of a long process of 
increased level of integration and the most notable economic 
union. In contrast, neither the members of the North American 
16 For more theoretical discussions, see Yeung, Perdikis, and Kerr, Regional Trading 
Blocs in the Global Economy, pp. 18-19; and Frankel, Regional Trading Blocs, pp. 12-17. 
17 The term "free trade area" (a form of preferential trade area) should not be con-
fused with "free trade," which entails a positive connotation of broad trade liberalization. 
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Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) nor the members of ASEAN FTA 
expect to literally eliminate all internal barriers to trade, as the 
name "free trade area" would imply. It should also be pointed out 
that not all trade among preferential trading partners takes place 
at preferential rates. Most agreements exclude certain sensitive 
sectors, most notably agriculture. 
Motivations for Integration 
Why do nations pursue regional integration? Largely speaking 
they do it for two sets of reasons: (1) politics and policymaking, 
and (2) economics. 
As a World Bank publication asserts, "Regional integration is 
good politics: It meets political needs, such as security or enhanced 
bargaining power, and it satisfies influential lobbies."18 Indeed, 
the main motivation for regional integration is often political, 
rather than economic. China's motivation for ACFTA illustrates 
this point. 
The first motivation is to use integration to consolidate peace 
and increase regional security. It is often assumed that creating 
linkages between economies can make conflicts more costly. Both 
Immanuel Kant's third definitive article of "perpetual peace"- cos-
mopolitan law19 - and Thomas Friedman's "Golden Arches Theory 
of Conflict Prevention20 affirm this insight. In the post-911 envi-
ronment, US Trade Representative Robert Zoellick justified his ag-
gressive pursuit of FTAs with such nations as Jordan, Israel, Chile, 
Singapore, Australia, Morocco, southern Mrica, and Western 
Hemisphere on national security ground. He argued, "While ter-
rorism isn't caused by poverty ... failed states, broken societies, ex-
treme poverty, create the fertile ground in which the seeds of 
terrorism can grow, and therefore we have a very strong interest in 
having a pro-growth and opportunity economic policy that comple-
ments our security agenda."21 Clearly the U.S. expected important 
strategic and political benefits from these FTAs, since the eco-
nomic benefits offered by these states were modest at best. 
18 Trading Blocs, p. 11. 
19 Immanuel Kant, "Perpetual Peace," in Lewis White Beck, ed., Immanuel Kant: On 
History (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1963), originally published in 1795. 
20 Thomas Friedman, Lexus and the Olive Tree (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 
1999), pp. 195-217. 
21 Peter Hatcher, "US Links Free Trade To Global Security," Australian Financial Re-
view (15 November 2002): 28. 
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Second, by joining together the weak can pool their strengths. 
Governments often seek to acquire greater bargaining power in 
multilateral negotiations by first tying in partner countries through 
regional commitments. At a regional level, a subset of countries 
could first strike their own agreement in order to increase bargain-
ing power and press for a better outcome. 
Third, regional agreements have been used to lock in institu-
tional changes and reforms. In the early 1990s, proponents of ne-
oliberal economic reform in Mexico sought to leverage NAFTA to 
enable desired changes. For trade liberalization, regional agree-
ments are a well-designed piece of commitment mechanism be-
cause they are built upon reciprocal preferences. 
Fourth, vested interests, such as powerful national bureaucra-
cies created to negotiate trade agreements, or certain sectors of the 
society that stand to gain or lose, often lobby the governments to 
seek regional agreements. 
Fifth, countries can benefit greatly from cooperation when they 
share resources - such as rivers, fishing grounds, hydroelectric 
power, or rail connection - or when they jointly overcome 
problems - such as pollution and transportation bottlenecks. By 
virtue of enhanced trust, regional agreements can help in this 
regard. 
Several economic rationales have also been marshaled for re-
gional agreements, which can be summarized as the allure of reap-
ing benefits from free trade without enduring the cost for 
adjustment. First, the theory of "second-best" holds that although 
multilateral agreements that aim at eliminating barriers across the 
board are almost always preferable, they are also more elusive. 
Hence, liberalization via a regional agreement might be more ben-
eficial to the world than the status quo. 
A second economic reason for governments to seek discrimina-
tory liberalization is that they may be able to reap gains from trade 
in product areas where they cannot compete internationally. RTAs 
thus could serve the purpose of shutting out third-party competi-
tion from more efficient suppliers. 
Third, small countries especially regard participation in re-
gional agreements as a defensive necessity. They fear exclusion 
from markets and see participation as an insurance policy against 
being placed at a competitive disadvantage through discriminatory 
policies. Richard Baldwin calls this "domino theory" of regional-
ism - idiosyncratic incidents of regionalism triggered a multiplier 
April 2006] FREE TRADE AGREEMJ!.Nr AND ''PEACEFUL RISE" 15 
effect that knocked down bilateral import barriers like a row of 
dominoes. 22 
As will be shown later, many of these characteristic political and 
economic considerations were clearly at work in the case of 
ASEAN-China FTA. 
ASEAN AND CHINA: INTERDEPENDENT BUT NoT INDISPENSABLE 
ASEAN was established on 8 August 1967 in Bangkok by the five 
original member states - Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singa-
pore, and Thailand. Brunei Darussalam joined on 8 January 1984, 
Vietnam on 28 July 1995, Laos and Myanmar on 23 July 1997, and 
Cambodia on 30 April1999, expanding its membership to 10. The 
last four entrants are also called newer members, or ASEAN-4. 
The ASEAN Declaration states that the aims and purposes of 
the Association are: ( 1) to accelerate the economic growth, social 
progress and cultural development in the region through joint en-
deavors in the spirit of equality and partnership in order to 
strengthen the foundation for a prosperous and peaceful commu-
nity of Southeast Asian nations, and (2) to promote regional peace 
and stability through abiding respect for justice and the rule of law 
in the relationship among countries in the region and adherence 
to the principles of the United Nations Charter.23 
Despite these common aspirations, ASEAN members vary con-
siderably - from the tiny oil-rich sultanate of Brunei (population: 
300,000) to the world's fourth most populous nation (and the larg-
est Muslim country), Indonesia; from the miniscule economy of 
Laos to the potential giant, Indonesia; from the impoverished 
ASEAN-4 to the wealthy Singapore and Brunei. Table 2 presents 
several basic economic indicators of ASEAN states. Comparable 
data for China are also included for reference. 
This table reveals the huge disparity among ASEAN nations, 
and such inequity raises important questions. Experiences from 
other world regions, particularly Western Europe, offer three illus-
trative lessons for ASEAN. First, small states are often more active 
than large states in promoting integration (e.g., the Benelux coun-
tries turned out to be "core" members at the forefront of each 
stage in the history of European integration);_ this is in contrast to 
22 Richard E. Baldwin, "The Cause of Regionalism," World Economy 20(7) (November 
1997): 865-888. 
23 See ASEA.N', "Overview: ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS," 
available online at <http:/ /www.aseansec.org/64.htm>. 
TABLE 2 
CHINA AND ASEAN: SELECT EcoNOMIC INDICATORS 
Brunei Cambodia Indonesia Laos Malaysia Myanmar Philippines Singapore Thailand Vietnam China 
Population 
(millions, 2001) 0.3 12.2 209.0 5.4 23.8 48.3 78.3 4.1 61.1 79.5 1,271.8 
GDP 
(US$ billions, 2001) N/A 3.4 145.3 1.8 88.0 14.2* 71.4 84.9 115.3 32.9 1,159.0 
GNI per capita 
(US$, 2001) N/A 280 680 300 3,400 300* 1,030 21,100 1,960 410 890 
PPP GDP 
(US$ billions, 2002 estimate) 6.5 20.4 714.2 10.4 198.4 73.7 379.7 112.4 445.8 183.3 5,989.0 
PPP GDP per capita 
(US$, 2002 estimates) 18,600 1,660 3,100 1,800 8,800 1,700* 4,600 25,200 7,000 2,700 4,700 
Exports 
(US$ billions, 2001) 3.0 1.4 52.3 0.3 95.2 2.7 35.1 127.0 67.7 16.5 325.6 
Imports 
(US$ billions, 2001) 1.4 1.7 32.1 0.6 76.8 2.5 33.5 113.0 58.1 16.8 295.3 
FDI inflows 
(US$ millions, 2000) N/A 125.7 -4,550.0 33.9 3,787.6 254.8 1,241.0 6,390.3 3,366.0 1,298.0 38,399.3 
Notes: * Estimates 
Sources: Author's compilation from World Bank Indicators Data Query (http:/ /www.worldbank.org/data/dataquery.httnl), The National Bureau of Asian 
Research, Strategic Asia Database (http:/ /strategicasia.nbr.org/Data/CView/), and the Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook 2003 (http:/ I 
www.odci.gov I cia/ publications/ factbook/index.httnl). 
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the "hegemonic stability" theory, which holds that the existence of 
a hegemon, both willing and capable of shouldering the cost of 
maintaining an open system, is the prerequisite to liberal economic 
regimes and institutions.24 Second, homogeneity - comparable 
levels of development, cultural affinities, and compatible political 
systems - facilitates successful "deep" integration. Third, deeper 
integration among the existing members is often considered help-
ful, if not essential, to "shallow integration" with newer members 
who are characterized by greater heterogeneity (e.g., EU's "grow-
ing pain" or "hiccups" in integrating with the former communist 
countries of Eastern Europe). 
ASEAN nations pride themselves for following certain "funda-
mental principles" in their relations with one another, as adopted 
in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in Southeast Asia, 
signed at the First ASEAN Summit on 24 February 1976: 
• Mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, ter-
ritorial integrity, and national identity of all nations; 
• The right of every State to lead its national existence free from 
external interference, subversion or coercion; 
• Non-interference in the internal affairs of one another; 
• Settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful manner; 
• Renunciation of the threat or use of force; and 
• Effective cooperation among themselves. 25 
In january 1992, the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) was estab-
lished to eliminate tariff barriers among the Southeast Asian coun-
tries with a view to integrating the ASEAN economies into a single 
production base and creating a regional market of 500 million peo-
ple. Under the AFTA, tariff rates levied on a wide range of prod-
ucts traded within the region will be reduced to no more than five 
percent. Quantitative and other non-tariff barriers are to be elimi-
nated. The newer members are expected to realize AFTA by 2006-
10.26 
Size is an important factor to intra-ASEAN integration and to 
ASEAN-China FTA. Table 2 shows that China towers over each in-
dividual ASEAN member and all of them combined. AFTA intends 
to create a regional market of over 500 million people. But this 
combined ASEAN magnitude would only constitute 29% of the 
population, 32% of the GDP, and 46% o~ the trade volume, of the 
24 See Immanuel Wallerstein, "The Three Instances of Hegemony in the History of 
the Capitalist World-Economy," Intemational]oumal of Comparative Sociology, 24(1-2) (1983). 
25 "Overview: ASEAN." 
26 ASEAN, Southeast Asia: A Free Trade Area, <http:/ /www.aseansec.org/12025.htm>. 
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combined ASEAN-China FTA. Covering 1.79 billion people, $1.7 
trillion in GDP, and $1.36 trillion in trade volume, the ACFTA will 
become the world's largest FTA (all calculated from Table 2). This 
is why there is a widely accepted view, expressed by Singaporean 
Trade and Industry Minister George Yeo, that an integrated 
ASEAN is the only viable response to an economically-rising 
China.27 
Table 3 shows the major export and import partners of individ-
ual ASEAN members and China. 
This table reveals several interesting patterns. Although China 
is among the top five trading partners for each ASEAN member, it 
is not the most important (Myanmar's import is the only excep-
tion); its importance to these nations is comparable to that of Tai-
wan's or South Korea's. In fact, the U.S. is the top export partner 
of five out of the ten ASEAN members (and the U.S. is also China's 
top export market); and Japan is the top import partner of four 
ASEAN nations (andJapan is also China's top import source). So, 
economic arguments are insufficient to explain ASEAN-China FTA. 
If economy of scale is the main concern, then ASEAN nations (and 
for that matter China itself) should pursue FTAs \\-ith their largest 
trade partners - the U.S. and Japan; and for that matter, China 
should also do the same. Why are ASEAN and China forging FTA 
with their secondary trading partners? As section 2 points out, re-
gional integration is often driven by political considerations, and 
ACFTA is no exception. The next section will examine some of the 
non-economic rationales for ACFTA. 
Although China's trade with ASEAN may not be as large or im-
portant as ASEAN's trade with the U.S. or ASEAN:Japan trade, it 
nevertheless has increased rapidly in recent years. Citing ASEAN 
official figures, Table 4 shows that from 1993 to 2001, total ASEAN 
exports to China increased seven-fold, from $4.5 billion to $31.6 
billion. During the same period, ASEAN imports from China in-
creased 5.5 times, from $4.3 billion to $23.8 billion. Two-way trade 
in 2001 stood at $55.4 billion. 
Table 5, using official statistics from China's Ministry of Com-
merce, highlights the importance of ASEAN-China trade but also 
helps place it in perspective. It should be noted that the Chinese 
official data in Table 5 groups together trade data of all fifteen 
member states of the European Union as one entity and the ten 
27 "How ASEAN Can Hold Its Own Against China," The Straits Times (12 November 
2002). From LexixNexis. 
TABLE 3 ~ 
>-; 
MAJOR TRADING PARTNERS oF ASEAN NATIONS AND CHINA (PERCENTAGE sHAREs oF THE couNTRY's ...... 
-Nl 
EXPORTS/IMPORTS) 0 0 
Ol 
........, 
Brunei Cambodia Indonesia Laos Malaysia Myanmar Philippines Singapore Thailand Vietnam China 
Export partners Japan U.S. Japan Vietnam u.s. Thailand U.S. Malaysia U.S. U.S. u.s. ~ ( 40.3) (60.2) (21) (26) (21) (31.4) (26.2) (17.4) (19.6) (15.2) (21.5) So. Korea Germany u.s. Thailand Singapore u.s. Japan u.s. Japan Japan Hong Kong 
(12.3) (9.1) (13.2) (19) (17.4) (13) (14.9) (15.3) (14.9) (14.9) (18) ~ Thailand U.K. Singapore France Japan India China HK Singapore Australia Japan (12.1) (7.1) (9.4) (7.5) (10.9) (7.4) (7.4) (9.7) (8) (7.1) (14.9) 
Australia Singapore So. Korea Germany China China Taiwan Japan HK China So. Korea tij 
(9.2) (4.4) (7.2) (5.3) (6.5) (4.7) (5.8) (7.1) (5.4) (6.6) (4.8) ~ 
u.s. China Hong Kong Singapore China China Germany ~ (8.1) (5.1) (5) (5.7) (5.5) (5.2) (6.5) China Taiwan Taiwan Malaysia Singapore ~ (6.4) (4.2) (4.9) (4) (5.5) Import partners Singapore Thailand Japan Thailand Japan China Japan Malaysia Japan So. Korea Japan (30.6) (24.8) (14) (59) (16.9) (27%) (21.6) (18.2) (23) (12.7) (18.1) ~ Japan Singapore Singapore Vietnam Singapore Singapore u.s. u.s. U.S. China Taiwan ~ (21.5) (16.9) ( 13.1) (12.3) (15.9) (19.5) (18.6) (14.3) (9.6) (12.2) (10.5) 
Malaysia China u.s. China u.s. Thailand Singapore Japan China Japan So. Korea ~ (17.4) (12.1) (8.5) (7.9) (15.5) (12) (7.8) (12.5) (7.6) (12.1) (9.7) ~ U.K. HK China China Malaysia So. Korea China Malaysia Singapore U.S. 
(6.1) (10.9) (7.8) (7.8) (9.1) (7.5) (7.6) (5.6) ( 11.8) (9.2) ~ Hong Kong So. Korea So. Korea So. Korea Taiwan China Taiwan Singapore Taiwan Germany (14) (5.5) (5.3) (5) (6.3) (5.7) (4.6) (4.5) (10.6) (5.6) 
Taiwan Taiwan So. Korea Hong Kong Thailand Taiwan Thailand ~ (5.1) (4.7) (5.3) (4.5) (4.6) (4.4) (5.4) 
Taiwan ttl 
• ( 4.1) 
Sources: Author's compilation from CIA, The World Factbook 2003 (http:/ /www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html). 
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TABLE 4: ASEAN TRADE WITH CHINA BY CouNTRY (1993- 2001) 
Table 4.1. ASEAN Export to China 
(Value in Thousand US$) 
COUNTRY 
1993 
Brunei Darussalam -
Cambodia 
-
Indonesia 1,249,494.1 
Malaysia 1,202,628.5 
Myanmar -
Philippines 173,874.0 
Singapore 1,902,697.9 
Thailand 
-
1994 
37.1 
-
1,280,043.2 
1,859,707.4 
-
163,967.0 
2,000,065.8 
-
TOTAL 4,528,694.5 ' 5,303,820.5 
1995 
152.2 
-
1,741,717.8 
1,806,866.6 
-
212,938.6 
2,439,216.6 
-
6,200,891.8 
Note: China including Hong Kong in 1999- 2001 
Table 4.2. ASEAN Import from China 
(Value in Thousand US $) 
COUNTRY 
1993 1994 
Brunei Darussalam - 34,931.4 
Cambodia - -
Indonesia 935,983.3 1,477,386.7 
Malaysia 816,772.8 1,200,709.0 
Myanmar - -
Philippines 180,662.9 294,046.6 
Singapore 2,402,944.9 2,751,912.8 
Thailand - -
TOTAL 4,336,363.9 5,758,986.5 
1995 
63,336.5 
-
1,495,223.3 
1,516,774.7 
-
475,876.6 
3,578,512.1 
-
7,129,723.2 
Note: China including Hong Kong in 1999- 2001 
Export 
1996 1997 
115.4 0.0 
- -
1,867,758.2 2,123,041.2 
1,519,935.5 1,313,812.7 
- -
327,921.7 244,411.6 
3,214, 704.8 4,195,491.8 
543,696.6 1,291,132.0 
7,474,132.2 9,167,889.3 
Import 
1996 1997 
72,500.2 55,090.6 
- -
1 ,235,458. 7 1,518,013.9 
1,719,986.8 1,916,805.4 
- -. 
676,506.8 871,565.5 
4,205,358.5 5,808,553.0 
1,307,809.3 3,312,855.6 
9,217,620.3 13,482,884.0 
Sources: ASEAN Trade Statistics data query (http:/ /202.154.12.3/trade/publicview.asp). 
1998 1999 
0.0 244.2 
- -
I ,832,034.4 3,338,942.2 
1,545,082.2 4,595,865.8 
- 65,076.9 
343,682.6 2,521,925.8 
4,059,714.3 12,718,557.3 
1,422,072.6 3,231,764.2 
9,202,586.1 26,472,376.4 
1998 1999 
20,620.9 72,415.9 
- -
904,459.4 1,469,664.0 
1,685,513.6 3,358,966.0 
- 223,665.3 
1,198,911.2 2,265,960.7 
4,853,367. 7 8,878,527.6 
2,548,662.2 3,138,797.8 
~.211,535.0 19,407,997.3 
2000 
22,270.0 
285,985.0 
4,321,848.9 
6,433,437.9 
86,525.3 
2,570,611.5 
16,236,398.3 
5,077,586.6 
35,034,663.5 
2000 
84,958.9 
364,110.9 
2,364,323.0 
6,572,884.9 
261,734.9 
1,984,916.9 
10,637,225.3 
4,210,755.3 
26,480,910.1 
2001 
127,741.3 
224,984.2 
3,490,998.1 
6,229,130.5 
103,700.5 
2,372,582.0 
16,140,398.9 
2,862,555.1 
31,552,090.6 
2001 
97,356.1 
203,774.4 
2,099,989.6 
5,129,407.3 
394,914.4 
2,212,320.0 
9,982,659.7 
3, 712,652.5 
23,833,074.0 
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TABLE 5 
CHINA's ToP TEN TRADING PARTNERS 
Unit: US$ billions; percentages 
Overall trade ExEorts ImEorts 
Partner Amount Share Partner Amount Share Partner Amount Share 
1 Japan 133.6 15.7 u.s. 92.5 21.1 Japan 74.2 18.0 
2 u.s. 126.3 14.8 Hong Kong 76.3 17.4 E.U. 53.1 12.9 
3 E.U. 125.2 14.7 E.U. 72.2 16.5 Taiwan 49.4 12.0 
4 Hong Kong 87.4 10.3 Japan 59.4 13.6 ASEAN 47.3 11.5 
5 ASEAN 78.3 9.2 ASEAN 30.9 7.1 So. Korea 43.1 10.4 
6 So. Korea 63.2 7.4 So. Korea 20.1 4.6 u.s. 33.9 8.2 
7 Taiwan 58.4 6.9 Taiwan 9.0 2.1 Hong Kong 11.1 2.7 
8 Russia 15.8 1.9 Australia 6.3 1.4 Russia 9.7 2.4 
9 Australia 13.6 1.6 Russia 6.0 1.4 Australia 7.3 1.8 
10 Canada 10.0 1.2 Canada 5.6 1.3 Brazil 5.8 1.4 
Sources: Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China, "Top Ten Export Markets," 
"Top Ten Import Sources," and "Top Ten Trade Partners" (all dated 2004-02-18), online at 
http:/ I english.mofcom.gov.cn/ article/200402/20040200 183706_1.xml, http:/ I english. 
mofcom.gov.cn/article/200402/20040200183744_l.xml, and http:/ I english.mofcom.gov.cn/ 
article/200402/20040200182458_1.xml. 
members of ASEAN as one entity. This accounting method con-
jures up the allure of elevated importance of EU and ASEAN -
hence, it is politically easier to sell the FTA to ASEAN as a whole 
and to show that China's trade flows to various markets are "bal-
anced." According to this table, ASEAN is China's fifth largest 
overall trade partner, constituting 9.2% of China's total trade; 
ASEAN is China's fifth largest export market and fourth most im-
portant import source. These more recent data, dated 18 February 
2004, show that China's total trade with ASEAN amounts to $78.3 
billion. 
To be sure, the U.S. remains the region's biggest trading part-
ner, but trade between China and the rest of Asia is booming. In 
October 2003, Chinese Premier WenJiabao urged Southeast Asian 
nations to achieve $100 billion worth of trade with China before 
2005 -almost double the 2001 figure of $55.4 billion. By compari-
son, U.S. trade with the ten members of ASEAN was $120 billion in 
2001.28 The race is thus on. 
In sum, although increasing trade and investment ties have 
caused China and ASEAN to become more economically interde-
pendent, these relationships are still trailing the region's economic 
relationships with the U.S., but the gap is narrowing. Although 
28 Jane Perlez, "Asian Leaders Find China a More Cordial Neighbor," The New York 
Times (18 October 2003): Al. 
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these economic facts arguably justifY a FTA, more important non-
economic reasons better explain why China "attaches great impor-
tance" to ASEAN-China FTA.29 
CHINA's FTA CALcuLus: PuRSUING "PEACEFUL RrsE" THROUGH 
EcoNOMIC STATECRAFT 
Commentators have offered various explanations for the initia-
tives taken by China to sign an FTA with ASEAN countries. Most of 
these accounts invoke standard economic arguments or fall under 
the category of conventional wisdom. For example, Kevin Cai 
identifies the three most crucial rationales for the ASEAN-China 
FTA are (1) such a ITA helps craft a response to intensified re-
gionalism elsewhere (Europe and North America), (2) ITA helps 
cement the growing economic ties between China and ASEAN, 
and (3) FTA helps coordinate government policies- a need made 
painfully clear by the Asian Financial Crisis.30 Employing a com-
putable general equilibrium (CGE) model based on international 
parity conditions, James Laurenceson finds that China's integra-
tion with ASEAN's five original members is already relatively ad-
vanced with respect to goods and services markets and he argues 
that future benefits from liberalization will be mainly felt in finan-
cial markets.31 Focusing on the ASEAN's four newer countries, 
Thitapha Wattanapruttipaisan believes that the ASEAN-China ITA 
will provide greater market access in resource- and agro-based 
products and some manufactured goods for ASEAN' s poorer four 
newer members, but will also see greater competition from China 
in both ASEAN-4's home and third-country markets.32 
However, this article differs from these standard economic the-
ories by adopting a realist approach. It argues that China's FTA 
with ASEAN countries is driven primarily by strategic considerations 
and that although the main instruments that it uses - FTAs - are 
economic, China's foremost goal is to ensure survival and expand 
power in a changing (i.e., more challenging) security environment. 
29 "China Attaches Great Importance to China-ASEAN Free-Trade Area," Xinhua 
News Agency (23 October 2002). 
30 Kevin G. Cai, "The ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement and East Asian Regional 
Grouping," Contemp{)T'ary Southeast Asia, 25(3) (2003): 387-404. 
31 James Laurenceson, "Economic Integration Between China and the ASEAN-5," 
ASEAN Economic Bulletin, 20(2) (August 2003): 103-11. 
32 Thitapha Wattanapruttipaisan, "ASEAN-China Free Trade Area: Advantages, Chal-
lenges, and Implications for the Newer ASEAN Member Countries," ASEAN Economic Bulle-
tin, 20(1) (April 2003): 31-48. 
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In short, China's FTA with ASEAN exemplifies the economic state-
craft of China's vaunted foreign policy of "peaceful ascendancy" or 
"peaceful rise" (to be explained later). 
The concept of "economic statecraft" involves the utilization of 
a state's economic tools (resources and capital) in its foreign policy 
conduct and is part of a state's statecraft - the art of conducting 
state affairs. By employing either positive (rewards) or negative 
(sanctions) means, economic statecraft seeks to advance a state's 
interests through ways that are less coercive than military means.33 
Although many scholars equate economic statecraft with economic 
sanctions and consequently question the validity of economic state-
craft, since "sanctions never work,"34 positive incentives such as 
trade benefits or aid are more effective instruments for achieving a 
state's objectives. China's FTA with ASEAN is a good example of 
this positive approach. If negative economic statecraft (sanctions) 
works less well for adversaries than for allies,35 positive economic 
statecraft (rewards) also works better for allies. China's trade of-
fensive thus better achieves its goals of improving relations with 
ASEAN and expanding influence in Southeast Asia than any previ-
ous approach that China had adopted in the past. 
One of the most interesting developments to the scholarly and 
policy communities in the last two or three years is China's "new" 
foreign policy, which marks significant departures from past prac-
tices in several key areas. In some respects, these changes indicate 
the desire of the so-called Fourth Generation leadership (centered 
around Hujintao) 36 to put their imprimatur on China's external 
33 David A. Baldwin, Economic Statecraft (Princeton, N]: Princeton University Press, 
1985) is a classic in the field of economic statecraft. 
34 E.g., Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Jeffrey J. Schott, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: 
History and Current Policy (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1985). 
In a recent critique, Daniel W. Drezner eta!., eds., The Sanctions Paradox: Economic Statecraft 
and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) grapples with 
the puzzle that despite the conventional wisdom that economic sanctions do not work in 
international affairs, why do countries wield them so often? 
35 Daniel Drezner argues that, paradoxically, countries will be most eager to use 
sanctions under conditions where they will produce the feeblest results. States anticipate 
frequent conflicts with adversaries, and are therefore more willing to use sanctions. How-
ever, precisely because they anticipate more conflicts, sanctioned states will not concede, 
despite the cost. Economic sanctions are thus far less likely to be effective between adversa-
ries than between allies. See note 34. 
36 "Fourth Generation" leadership refers to such leaders as Hu Jintao, Wen Jiabao, 
and Zeng Qinghong, that were elevated to top positions after the Chinese Communist 
Party's 16th> National Congress in November 2002. See Susan Shirk, H. Lyman Miller, 
Gang Lin, Lowell Dittmer, Cheng Li, David Shambaugh, Richard Baum, The 16th CCP Con-
24 
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conduct. Analysts have used various labels to describe these 
changes, such as China's "new diplomacy,"37 "independent foreign 
policy of peace," or "pragmatic, balanced strategy in foreign pol-
icy."38 The Chinese have called this the policy of "heping jueqz" 
("peaceful ascendancy"39 or "peaceful rise" 40). The concept of 
"peaceful rise" first appeared at the 2003 Boao Forum for Asia 
hosted by China. Zheng Bijian, then vice president of the Central 
Party School (now Chairman of China Reform Forum) and a key 
theoretical advisor to Hu, delivered the speech, "New Path of 
China's Peaceful Rise and Asia's Future" on 3 November 2003 at 
the Boao Forum.41 The concept was formally introduced to Asia by 
Chinese President Hu Jintao on his tour of Southeast Asia in Octo-
ber 2003,42 and to America by Chinese Premier Wenjiabao in his 
speech at Harvard University in December 2003.43 The 2004 Boao 
Forum further held a conference on "China's Peaceful Rise and 
Economic Globalization. "44 
However, starting in mid-2004, the theory of "peaceful rise," put 
forth by the Hujintao regime as China's grand strategy for the 21st 
century, quietly disappeared from the statements of senior govern-
ment officials and the CCP's official documents- to be replaced by 
gress and Leadership Transition in China, Wilson Center Asia Program Special Report 105 
(Washington, DC: The Wilson Center, 2002): 1-48. 
37 Medeiros and Fravel, "China's New Diplomacy." 
38 "WWP: Beijing Adopts Pragmatic, 'Balanced' Foreign Policy," Hong Kong Wen Wei 
Po (Internet ver.sion-WWW) in Chinese, 27 January 2004 [Dispatch from Beijing News Center 
by Reporter Liao Ya-meng, "China Adopts 'Balanced' Strategy in Foreign Policy'], PTS 
Translated Text for FBIS, FBIS-CHI-2004-0127, obtained via World News Connection. 
39 Yoichi Funabashi, "China is Preparing a 'Peaceful Ascendancy,'" International Her-
ald Tribune (30 December 2003); "Author Sees China's Role in Pushing India, Pakistan 
Toward Detente,'' Calcutta The Telegraph (Internet version-WWW) in English, 25 December 
2003 (article by Jairam Ramesh, "China is Changing"), FBIS Transcribed Text, FBIS-NES-
2003-1225, obtained via World News Connection. 
40 Robert W. Radtke, "China's 'Peaceful Rise' Overshadowing U.S. Influence in 
Asia?" The Christian Science Monitor (8 December 2003): 9. 
41 The official website of the 2003 Boao Forum's agenda for November 3, http:// 
history.boaoforum.org/2003nh/rcts/t20031027 _173175.shtml, asks users to install a secur-
ity certificate provided by a company based in Beijing in order to download Zheng's 
speech. For a precis by China's official Xinhua News Agency, see "Boao Forum: Chinese 
Official Says China Important to Asian Development," XINHUA (3 November 2003), FBIS-
CHI-2003-1103, obtained via World News Connection. 
42 "WWP: Beijing Adopts" and Radtke, "China's 'Peaceful Rise."' 
43 "PRC Premier WenJiabao at Harvard Says China's Development Depends on Own 
Efforts," XINHUA (10 December 2003), FBIS-CHI-2003-1210, obtained via World News 
Connection 
44 The agenda of this conference is available online at <http://history.boaoforum. 
org/english/home/NoticeBoard/t20040331_562702.shtml>. Accessed 13 October 2004. 
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a slogan of "peaceful development."45 Analysts attribute this to the 
power struggle between Hu and his predecessor Jiang Zemin, who 
vacated the posts of Party chief in November 2002, and State presi-
dent in March 2003, but held on to the chairmanship of the power-
ful Party Central Military Commission until October 2004, and was 
widely believed to be casting influence behind the scene.46 The 
opposition to Hu's favorite policy comes from an interesting com-
bination of sources: Some in the party reject the use of the term 
"rise," which they believe may aggravate the theory of China as a 
threat, whereas the hardliners led by the armed forces, who claim 
that focusing only on a peaceful posture will result in China being 
taken lightly on the issues of maritime resources and Taiwan. In 
other words, some oppose "peaceful," and others abjure "rise." 
Nevertheless, now that Jiang has given up his last official post 
and Hu is expected to gradually consolidate his power and the fact 
foreign reception of "peaceful rise" is more positive than the 
"China threat" theory, Hu is expected to further advance the con-
cept and strategy of "peaceful rise" - in action if not in words. In-
deed, in a recent article published in Foreign Affairs aimed at 
Western audience, Zheng Bijian, a key advisor to Hu, further expli-
cates China's aspirations for "peaceful rise" to great-power status.47 
Hence, it is important to analyze the key elements of this policy. 
China's "peaceful rise," promoted as a non-ideological foreign 
policy, contains several key elements. First, it is based on an em-
brace of globalization as part of the solution to China's growth im-
peratives. It relies both on China's domestic economy and the 
international marketplace to sustain and fuel growth. China's 
Fourth-Generation leaders determine that the international envi-
ronment that China faces has changed and the country must re-
spond "correctly to a world which is becoming multipolar, to 
economic globalization, and to the trend of development in scien-
45 "Peaceful 'Rise' No More, Replaced by 'Development': Facing Opposition from 
Various Sides, the Once Popular Slogan Suddenly Disappeared" (in Chinese), The World 
journal Online (25 August 2004), <http:/ /www.worldjoumal.com/"\\j-ch-news.php?nt_seq_ 
id=1037880>. Accessed 25 August 2004. 
46 "Tokyo Daily: 'Peaceful Rise' Theory Scrapped Due to Hu,Jiang Power Struggle," 
Tokyo Shimbun (Internet Version-WWW), 6 August 2004, FBIS-EAS-2004-0806, obtained via 
World News Connection. 
47 Zheng Bijian, "China's 'Peaceful Rise' to Great-Power Status," Foreign Affairs 
84(5 )(September/October 2005): 18-24. For a critique of this non-ideological foreign pol-
icy, see Lanxin Xiang, ""''hy Washington Can't Speak Chinese," Washington Post (16 April 
2006): B3. 
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tific and technological advancement."48 Now is especially a "period 
of important strategic opportunity" for achieving China's para-
mount goal- in the words of one analyst, "it is all part of a single-
minded focus on economic development oriented to making 
China an economic superpower in every respect .. .in the next two 
decades."49 
Second, to achieve that goal, China must secure a peaceful in-
ternational environment that is crucial to sustaining China's eco-
nomic development and augmenting China's power. Peace in the 
Asia-Pacific region - China's backyard - is thus essential. Hence, 
China's "peaceful rise" is designed to counter deep Asian appre-
hension about China as a competitor for trade, investment, and 
jobs, and a security threat. At a practical level, this means that 
when dealing with its most formidable challenger (the U.S.), China 
must "bide its time and hide its capacities" (taoguang yanghui) -
avoiding a premature showdown or confrontation with the U.S., 
especially in light of the Bush Administration's imperial strategy. 
And when dealing with its nervous neighbors, China must replace 
its brusque "Great Power Diplomacy," which Third-Generation 
leaders like Jiang Zemin upheld, with a good-neighbor diplomacy. 
The timing is ideal, as the U.S. is distracted by the war on ter-
ror, Iraq, Iran, and North Korea, while Southeast Asia is still grap-
pling with the aftermath of the 1997-8 Asian Financial Crisis. In 
light of America's single-minded pursuit of its own narrow agenda 
and Japan's diminished stature, China's "charm offensive" toward 
Southeast Asia - a pragmatic approach consisting of increasing in-
vestment and trade, and proposing myriad of FTAs throughout 
Asia- has won much good will in the region.50 
48 "Hu Jintao Summarizes China's World View in Political Bureau Study Session," 
Beijing Xinhua Domestic Service in Chinese 1155 GMT 24 February 2004 ["Hu Jintao at CPC 
Central Committee Political Bureau's lOth Collective Study Session Stresses, Continue to 
Take a Broad View of the World While Analyzing the Situation, Improve the Ability to 
Work Well with Reform and Opening Up"], FBIS Translated Text, FBIS-CHI-2002-0224, 
obtained via World News Connection. 
49 "Author Sees China's Role." See note 39. 
50 Jane Perlez, "China is Romping with the Neighbors (U.S. is Distracted), The New 
York Times (3 December 2003): AI; "Asian Leaders Find China a More Cordial Neighbor," 
NYT (18 October 2003): AI; "The Charm from Beijing," NYT (9 October 2003); Radtke, 
"China's 'Peaceful Rise;'" Michael Vatikiotis and Murray Hiebert, "How China is Building 
an Empire," Far Eastern Economic Review (20 November 2003). For a more sober reflection, 
see Marvin Ott, "Watching China Rise Over Southeast Asia," International Herald Tribune 
Online (15 September 2004), reprinted from YaleGlobal Online. 
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Third, this new diplomacy is characterized by several important 
changes in style, if not substance: (1) Instead of acting like an ag-
grieved victim, China now aspires to be a responsible great power 
and is acting increasingly like one. (2) Whereas China used to dis-
trust "multilateralism" for fear that multilateral institutions could 
be used to constrain or punish it, now Chinese leaders recognize 
that deeply engaging these organizations help promote the coun-
try's trade and security interests and limit American power. For 
China, the word "multilateralism" now sounds like a coded opposi-
tion to America's "unilateralism," and China prefers a "multipolar" 
world (in which China acts as a great power) to a "unipolar" world 
founded on U.S. hegemony. (3) On many contentious and intrac-
table issues, China has also adopted more pragmatic stances. On 
the South China Sea issue, China acceded to ASEAN's Treaty of 
Amity and Cooperation (TAC) and promoted peaceful dialogue 
over territorial disputes. On Taiwan, China has replaced its mili-
tary bluster with economic enticement. ( 4) China is more aware 
that its rise has consequences for the Asia-Pacific region and be-
yond. So it is keen on easing the concerns of various countries. 
(5) China has become much more actively engaged in, and seeks .. 
to shape, regional affairs. Its hosting of the Six-Party Talk over 
North Korea's nuclear issue is a good example.51 
Fourth, the major instrument used in advancing China's objec-
tives is its economic power, which is buoyed by its phenomenal eco-
nomic growth, rapidly expanding domestic markets, and voracious 
appetite for raw materials needed for its economic development. 
China's economic boom has benefited the recovery of several 
Asian countries, but also forced many traditional industries of 
other nations to relocate to China. Its vastly increased demand for 
raw materials has contributed to the hike in global oil prices and 
an economic bonanza for such resource-rich countries as Brazil 
and Australia.52 
51 As a sign of the tug-of-war between proponents and opponents of "peaceful rise" 
and the spasmodic nature of its foreign policy, observers have noted that a nationalistic 
impulse has caused China's relations with its neighbors to worsen in recent months -wit-
nessing the row with Japan over the Asian Soccer Cup incident and Japanese Prime Minis-
ter Koizumi's visit to the Yasukuni shrine, the row with South Korea over the ancient 
kingdom of Kogyuro, and the increasingly strident attitude toward Taiwan in the aftermath 
of the reelection of Chen Shui-bian in 2004. 
52 Ted C. Fishmen, "The Chinese Century," The New York Times Magazine (4 July 
2004): 24; Oliver August, "Enter the Dragon, Breathing Fire into Economy," The Times (16 
February 2004): 13. 
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In the context of Southeast Asia, China's ITA with ASEAN 
helps cultivate goodwill among China's important neighbors, 
maintain peace and security in the region, defuse American influ-
ence, and secure key markets and raw materials needed for China's 
economic security. It is thus a sine qua non of "peaceful rise" - the 
fundamental strategy of China's new diplomacy for survival and de-
velopment. Kevin Cai argues that China's WTO ascension in 2001 
and its ASEAN ITA initiative that immediately followed represent a 
"new stage in the nation's policy of opening to the outside world 
and are logically related to each other."53 
To sum up, China's "peaceful rise" is a comprehensive long-
term strategy leveraging globalization as catalyst to accelerate 
China's economic development and elevate China's power and 
stature. The language is peace and stability, the style is construc-
tive diplomacy, and the substance is economics - at least for now. 54 
China's FTA agenda exemplifies the economic statecraft of this 
overall strategy. Geopolitics, rather than purely economic reasons, 
drives China into trade talks. The hallmarks of China's arrival as a 
major player in world and regional affairs include: (1) using multi-
lateralism to counter what China sees as U.S. unilateralism, (2) 
talking of the need for a new international political and economic 
order, and (3) promoting an East Asia pact to match European 
and North American free-trade agreements. 
ASEAN's MoTNATIONS AND ACFTA's PossiBLE REGIONAL IMPACT 
If China's motivations for ACFTA are mainly strategic, what are 
ASEAN nations' considerations? How will ASEAN-China FTA im-
pact ASEAN members? How will it affect regional and interna-
tional balance of power? Three fundamental reasons explain why 
ASEAN embrace the FTA with China. 
The first argument is the so-called "bandwagoning" thesis. 
Each individual ASEAN member is too weak vis-a-vis China. To 
augment their bargaining power, ASEAN members must pool their 
resources together so as to overcome the very plausible collective 
action problem. Facing a much bigger and economically ascend-
ing China, these nations find out that if they are to have any hope 
53 Kevin G. Cai, "The China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement and Taiwan." 
54 One Indian writer quips, "It is all part of the new PRC syndrome - not the old 
People's Republic of China, but a new Peaceful Rise of China." "Author Sees China's 
Role." 
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of luring foreign investments, they need to trumpet their growing 
ties with Asia's next giant.55 
The second is the "China market" argument. Individual 
ASEAN members clearly see FTA with China as a logical step to-
ward partaking in China's growing domestic market, made increas-
ingly prosperous because of China's entry into the WTO and the 
benefits arising from the phasing-in of China's pledged liberaliza-
tion. China's offer of "early harvest" - a unilateral goodwill mea-
sure- is especially appealing to the poorer ASEAN-4 members. 
The third argument sees the ITA as a lever in a sort of "balance 
of power" logic. ASEAN nations hope to use the ITA with China as 
a catalyst to accelerate their own integration (AFTA) 56 and a ploy 
to engage larger trading partners, such as Japan, the U.S., and the 
EU. Already, ASEAN-China FTA is causing some concerns for Ja-
pan, and prompts Tokyo to redouble its endeavor in engaging an 
area that it has traditionally dominated. For example, in its sum-
mit meeting with ASEAN in December 2003,Japanese Prime Minis-
ter Junichiro Koizumi pledged $3 billion in new aid to Southeast 
Asia (it is already receiving 60% of its overseas aid from Japan), 
and promised to work with the region to maintain security ties, 
liberate trade and create a broad "economic partnership."57 Inter-
estingly, in the eyes of some, Japan's new emphasis on fostering 
closer relations with ASEAN is driven by one major consideration -
China. 5 8 
Space allows only this cursory survey of ASEAN's motivation for 
ITA with China. However, it also raises some questions about the 
impact of ACITA on ASEAN and other countries in the region. 
First, China could turn out to be a fierce competitor. After all, 
China and most of ASEAN members are developing economies; 
55 "Everybody's Doing It," The Economist (26 February 2004). 
56 "How ASEAN Can Meet the Chinese Challenge," The Business Times Singapore (1 
August 2003), obtained via Lexis-Nexis; Michael Shari, "A New Front in the Free-Trade 
Wars; The ASEAN Nations Are Slashing Tariffs to Compete with China," Business Week (3 
June 2002): 23. 
57 Audrey McAvoy, ':Japan Pledges $3 Billion in Aid for Asia," Associated Press (12 
December 2003); Anthony Rowley, "Koizumi to Convince ASEAN on Integration," The Bus-
iness Times Singapore (1 December 2003). However, some analysts believe that because of 
Japan's heavy protection of its agricultural sector, a FTA with ASEAN similar to the ASEAN-
China FTA appears unlikely. 
58 Leslie Fang, "China's Not in Competition with Japan," The Strait Times (19 Decem-
ber 2003); "ASEAN Must Deepen Ties with Japan," The Business Times Singapore (31 July 
2003); Kwan Weng Kim, "Japan 'to Remain Top ASEAN Partners for Next 20 Years'; but It 
Will Have to Jostle with China for the Position in 50 Year, says PM Goh," The Strait Times (3 
December 2003). 
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they are competitive, rather than complementary. There have also 
been few success stories of regional integration that consist of all 
developing nations. 
Rodolfo Severino, ASEAN's secretary-general, is aware that such 
industries as textiles, toy, and motorcycle manufactures will be neg-
atively affected in the short term, although he believes long-term 
benefits will follow. 59 Because of its almost inexhaustible unskilled 
labor and huge amounts of FDI, China may pose an especial chal-
lenge to the ASEAN-4 in their home or third-country markets. 
China received the lion's share of FDI inflows to the entire de-
veloping world. As Table 1 shows, in 2000, China received more 
than three times the combined total of FDI inflows to the ten 
ASEAN nations. The FDI that is currently going into China for 
China's intrinsic value is unlikely to be distracted by an FTA with 
ASEAN, and some of the FDI going into ASEAN now may end up 
going into China (for the larger pot directly). A caveat is that Chi-
nese companies seem keen on investing in Southeast Asia. This 
somewhat mitigates China's competition for FDI with ASEAN. 
Second, there are real concerns that ACFTA may undermine 
AFTA. This is thanks to China's "divide and conquer" negotiation 
tactic. Some worry that China may distract a core trading group 
from pursuing its better interests by offering an FTA. These skep-
tics question whether China's real motivation is actually domina-
tion, as opposed to integration, and this could see ASEAN not 
complete full integration, trying instead to cash in on the huge 
Chinese economy.6° For example, while insisting on ASEAN's col-
lective recognition of China as a full market economy (thus the spe-
cial concessions China made in its WTO accession will not apply in 
its trade with ASEAN),61 China negotiated early harvest provisions 
59 Barry Wain, "Some in ASEAN Have Issues with China ITA," Australian Business 
Intelligence (8 October 2002): 1008281i9293 (The Asian Wall Street Journal - ABIX via 
COMTEX). 
60 Garry Bowditch, "Trade Pact Carries Risk for ASEAN," Australian Business Intelli-
gence (12 November 2002): 1008316i2190 (The Australian Financial Review - ABIX via 
COMTEX). 
61 Article 14- Recognition of China's Market Economy Status- of the Agreement 
on Trade in Goods states: 
Each of the ten ASEAN Member States agrees to recognize China as a full market 
economy and shall not apply ... Sections 15 and 16 of the Protocol of Accession of 
the People's Republic of China to the WTO and Paragraph 242 of the Report of 
the Working Party on the Accession of China to WTO in relation to the trade 
between China and each of the ten ASEAN Member States. 
Section 15 of China's WTO accession protocol deals with Price Comparability in Determin-
ing Subsidies and Dumping. Section 16 provides Transitional Product-Specific Safeguard 
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with individual ASEAN nations bilaterally by observing the different 
interests of each ASEAN nation with respect to ACFTA. 
Whereas China has a very clear strategic goal, as discussed ear-
lier, ASEAN does not have a clear picture about its place in the new 
strategic environment of an emergent China. One Australian ana-
lyst thinks that under these circumstances the best that ASEAN can 
do is to lock itself in as a fringe player on the spokes of China's 
regional trade architecture, while further enhancing the attractive-
ness of China as the hub for regional investment and production.62 
In this view, ASEAN will be reduced to a role of auxiliary actor in 
the main show- China's rise. 
ACFTA may entail differentiated consequences for other coun-
tries in East Asia. For example, it may undercut America's vast in-
fluence in the region. Already nations in this region are adopting 
some sort of "hedging" strategy by simultaneously improving their 
ties with China while ensuring the continued presence of the 
United States. Although the U.S. has countered with a ITA with 
Singapore, a region-wide FTA with ASEAN is not currently on U.S. 
priority. 
ACFTA may also spur the region's other economic giant, Japan, 
into more active economic diplomacy with ASEAN out of fear of 
being edged out by China. 63 
And finally, ACFTA may pose a special challenge for Taiwan. 
As a major trading nation, Taiwan should be included in various 
Asian FTAs. However, China's steadfast opposition to any country 
signing FTA with Taiwan (because China claims this would "inter-
fere in China's internal affairs") and its offer of a Hong Kong-style 
Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA) to Taiwan,64 
which Taiwan refuses, have threatened to cause Taiwan's isolation 
and "marginalization" from the ongoing process of regional inte-
gration in East Asia.65 Taiwan has sought to forge FTAs with the 
Mechanism. <http:/ I docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/WT /L/ 432.doc>. Paragraph 
242 of the Working Party Report addresses possible disruptions from China's textile prod-
ucts. <http:/ I docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/ t/WT / ACC/ CHN49.doc>. 
62 Garry Bowditch, "Trade Pact with China Carries llisk for ASEAN," Australian Fi-
nancial Review (13 November 2002): 63. 
63 "Japan Needs Trade Pact with ASEAN," Daily Yomiuri (19 July 2005): 4. 
64 China-Hong Kong CEPA calls for gradual elimination of all tariff and non-tariff 
barriers in goods and services. This entails the political symbolism that trade between the 
mainland and Hong Kong, though both WTO members, is "internal" trade. Taiwan un-
derstandably rejects this scheme and insists that as a WTO member, it has the same right as 
China in signing FTAs with other countries. 
65 Cai, "The China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement," p. 591 and 587. 
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U.S. and Japan, hoping that pacts with these important countries 
will herald more FTAs with other countries in the region. 
In sum, China's active trade diplomacy, as exemplified by 
ACFTA, has caused a "trade race" in the region with profound stra-
tegic consequences. 
WHITHER ACFTA? READING HISTORY AND CoNSTRUCTIVISM 
What does ACFTA or China's "peaceful rise" mean for the re-
gion's future? A historical metaphor is illustrative here. Historians 
John King Fairbank and Merle Goldman argue that traditional 
China, seeing itself as the superior Middle Kingdom, carried out its 
foreign policy based on a tribute system, which was a "reciprocal 
foreign relationship between superior and inferior" in that tribute 
offerings were normally reciprocated by lavish gifts from the em-
peror; hence, "accepting China's supremacy was materially worth-
while." In addition, the tribute system early became the 
institutional setting and indeed "cover for foreign trade."66 
Another scholar points out that China and its tributaries had 
far more interaction with each other than is commonly acknowl-
edged. "Trade, both private and tributary, made up a significant 
portion of both government revenues and GNP. Under this sys-
tem, these countries were a thriving, complex, and vibrant regional 
order" and the tributary system was "a form of disguised staple 
trade."67 Other scholars have argued that asymmetry or hierarchy 
(with China predominating), rather than balance of power or the 
Westphalian "horizontal" international system predicated on sover-
eign equality, has empirically and theoretically contributed to sta-
bility based on Asian history.68 
To say that China's FTA with ASEAN evokes the ancient tribu-
tary system and threatens to institutionalize China's dominant posi-
tion and ASEAN's subordinate status in the form of trade obviously 
risks the charge of being a false historical analogy. However, the 
analogy is not entirely inappropriate. The Chinese are a history-
conscious people. After all, until recently their foreign policy was 
66 John King Fairbank and Merle Goldman, China: A New History, enlarged ed. (Cam-
bridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), pp. 112-3. 
67 David Kang, "Hierarchy and Stability in Asian Intemational Relations," in G. John 
Ikenberry and Michael Mastanduno, eds., International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), p. 172-3. 
68 Brantly Womack, "China and Southeast Asia: Asymmetry, Leadership and Nor-
malcy," Pacific Affairs 76(4)(Winter 2003-4). 
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driven by the legacy of "century of humiliation." The main differ-
ence is that in the past, the Chinese believed in their cultural 
supremacy and cared more about the others' acknowledgement of 
China's cultural superiority than actual occupation - in other 
words, learning is only one-way. Today, China exists in a globalized 
world defined by a different paradigm. To survive in an increas-
ingly challenging environment, China has proved that it can be a 
fast learner. It is learning the new rules and playing the new 
games. Learning is now two-way. Liking the FTA to the modern-
day tribute system may be an exaggeration, but calling it the eco-
nomic statecraft of China's "peaceful rise" in light of China's fun-
damental aspiration for rising to the position of preeminent power 
is entirely proper. 
As constructionists would like to point out, the structure of 
elites' beliefs and interests determine whether anarchy is conflic-
tual or cooperative, 5 9 it is not sufficient to simply infer China's real 
intention from its manifested behavior. As China is seeking peace-
ful ascendancy, other countries can interpret its presently more ac-
commodating new diplomacy as a fundamental shift. However, the 
available evidence is not sufficient to warrant this optimism. Mter 
all, the Chinese seem to offer only a tactical reason for their re-
straint - "biding one's time and hiding one's capabilities." What 
will they do after they achieve their goal of becoming an economic 
superpower? Will economic success breed an aggressive national-
ism?70 Will it convince Chinese leaders that China can finally take 
on the U.S. and turn the twenty-first century world order into Pax 
Sinica? While Westerners think most highly of the positive conno-
tation of peace (as an end) in China's strategy of "peaceful rise," it is 
not clear whether the Chinese use peace as a new means for its 
unwavering end. Will China's neighbors and potential detractors 
still be concerned with a rising China, no matter how it has arisen? 
No one knows. Clearly with history in mind, U.S. Trade Repre-
sentative Robert Zoellick recently said that China's increasing eco-
nomic power and global influence must be integrated into the 
69 Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It," International Organization, 
46(2) (Spring 1992): 391-425. 
70 Hsu Tung-ming, "China's Rising Not All that 'Peaceful,"' Taipei Times (19 August 
2004): 8. <http:/ /www.taipeitimes.com/News/ edit/archives/2004/08/19/2003199349>. 
Accessed 19 August 2004. 
34 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF CHINESE STUDIES [Vol. 13:5 
international community.71 It is not just good economics; it is also 
good politics. 
71 "USTR Says China's Power Must Be Integrated Into World Community" (USTR 
Zoellick's Feb. 25 remarks to Asia Society), e-mail update from "USINFO East Asia" 
<iipgeap@STATE.GOV>. 
